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ABSTRACT

A disagreement over two questions contributes to further disagreement about the war
on terrorism. First, what is terrorism? If terrorism is a term to intensify negative connotations
of any activity, then all unjust acts are terrorism potentially. I argue that terrorism is a
specific act; it is the use, or threat of use, of premeditated violence against noncombatants,
intended to coerce a group into some course of action. Second, is the war on terrorism just?
Because terrorism is not a pejorative, we must evaluate terrorism to determine if response to
terrorism is response to an unjust aggressor. Using Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory, I
show that victims of terrorism and the international community have just cause to respond to
terrorism because all terrorists intentionally harm innocents to advance their cause. Even if
terrorists have just cause, their terrorist acts are unjust because they maximize civilian risk.
When nothing else will stop a terrorist attack, war is just. Just war minimizes civilian
risk and only targets people responsible for unjust aggression. The Bush administration’s war
on terrorism uses a preventative strategy to eliminate future terrorist attacks. Using war to
prevent future terrorism is just only when there is a legitimate threat of terrorism and no
alternative short of war will stop the attack. The United States had just cause for the war in
Afghanistan because war was necessary to stop al Qa’ida, a legitimate threat, from attacking
again; however, the United States did not have just cause for the war in Iraq because although
Saddam Hussein was a legitimate threat, means short of war were available to restrain him
from supporting terrorists. By defining terrorism properly and using the resources of Just War
Theory, we can continue to evaluate engagements in the war on terrorism.
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INTRODUCTION

General Sherman was correct—war is hell; however, peace is not always the best
alternative. Because there are worse things than war (namely, the persistence of an unjust
war), it is necessary to be able to determine when military force must be used to stop some
violence or oppression. Just War Theory (henceforth, JWT) was developed in response to the
need for standards to determine when a declaration of war is just and which acts in war are
just. Although conventional war is typically its subject, we can use JWT to evaluate
unconventional acts of war like terrorism.
Discussion about the war on terrorism, particularly the war in Iraq, raises at least two
philosophical issues. First, what is terrorism? Because “terrorism” often is a derogatory term
in public debate, some people use the term to bolster their cause. 1 I argue that terrorism is not
a term that denotes the intensity of a bad act; terrorism is a specific kind of activity that we
judge just or unjust. Second, is the war on terrorism, as carried out by the Bush
administration, just? Once we properly understand terrorism, the war on terrorism is not a
war against a clear injustice. We must study the justice of the war on terrorism by evaluating
terrorism and limits to various responses to it. I argue that using war in the war on terrorism
is just only if it is necessary to stop a legitimate threat. In what follows, I bring the resources
of philosophical thinking, particularly JWT, to bear on these questions. My aim is to show

1 The public implies an activity is horrible when they add “terrorism” to the term for the activity. Use of
terrorism as a term to intensify the negative connotations of an act is evident in several editorials. For example,
in the Toronto Star, Van Alphen refers to a $200 million dollar payout to investors as “corporate terrorism”
because the deal was likely to force the company to go bankrupt. In the Chicago Defender, violent crime in
urban communities is “urban terrorism” because it disproportionately affects minorities. In the Champlain
Islander, Robert Skinner calls sexual predators “sexual terrorists” because their victims are “forever
psychologically wounded.” By calling some activity “terrorism,” we imply that the activity is wrong.
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how the public debate over terrorism and the war on terrorism benefit from philosophical
thinking.
In the first section, I develop a working definition of terrorism. Because we accept
that we know terrorism when we see it, the public uses the term “terrorism” to denote ideas
and interests with which they strongly disagree (e.g., “sexual terrorism” or “corporate
terrorism”). Terrorism is not a qualifying term because it indicates a specific violent activity,
irrespective of it being unacceptable. Terrorism is distinct from other forms of political
violence because it is the use or threat of premeditated violence against noncombatants in
order to coerce a group into some course of action.
In the second section, I evaluate the war on terrorism drawing on Michael Walzer’s
JWT, which is the predominant view in philosophy on just wars. Because a just war responds
to an unjust aggressor, for the war on terrorism to be just, terrorism must be unjust. JWT is
appropriate for evaluating terrorism because terrorism is an act of war. All terrorism is unjust
because terrorists’ means violate the rules of conduct in war. Terrorists intentionally harm
people not responsible for alleged injustice in order to spread fear in some targeted group. All
terrorism is unjust, even if terrorists have just cause for acting, because the strategy terrorists
use to advance their cause is unjust.
Because terrorism is unjust, victims of terrorism have just cause to respond; however,
the principles of proportionality and discrimination limit justifiable responses to terrorism.
Just responses must target the people responsible for terrorism only and must not harm
civilians disproportionate to the objective of the response. Because war harms civilians, it is
the last resort. When a nation responds to the threat of future terrorism, it should only declare
war if there are no alternatives available with less potential harm to civilians.

2

According to the Bush administration, in the war on terrorism, the United States will
resort to war only when no other means are available. 2 A just preventative war attempts to
stop a legitimate threat from attacking by using war (because it is the only option). In
contrast, an unjust preventative war attempts to stops a possible threat from attacking in the
distant future by using war (even though it is not the only option). I argue that the United
States had just cause for the war in Afghanistan because al Qa’ida was a legitimate threat of
future attack and war was the only way to find the terrorist cells in the nation. The United
States did not have just cause for the war in Iraq because if the United States renewed and
enforced the United Nations’ mandatory inspections, the United States may have prevented
attacks in the distant future.
The purpose of this study is to clarify the definition of terrorism and to apply the
resources of just war theory to evaluation of the war on terrorism. To do this, we must
reevaluate what we consider terrorism and examine how justice constrains the war on
terrorism.

2

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 16 March 2006,
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CHAPTER 1
WHAT IS TERRORISM?

Developing a precise definition of the term “terrorism” is problematic for two reasons.
First, people do not consistently refer to one activity as “terrorism.” In public debate, the term
“terrorism” is often used as a “catch-all pejorative” for another’s political agenda with which
the speaker disagrees. 3 Second, many believe that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom fighter” because they do not distinguish a terrorist’s cause from a terrorist’s means. I
argue that terrorism is distinct from other forms of political violence because it is a specific
strategy. A terrorist is not necessarily an agent with an unjust cause; a terrorist is an agent
who uses, or threatens to use, premeditated violence against noncombatants in order to coerce
a group into some course of action. Once we have a working definition in place, we can
evaluate terrorism by JWT. If a response to terrorism is just, then terrorism must be unjust.

Terrorism as a Pejorative
The first recorded use of the term "terrorism" referred to acts committed by the French
government during the Reign of Terror. 4 At this time, terrorism referred to a ruler’s actions
(e.g., the use of the guillotine indiscriminately against members of certain groups or
discriminately against members of certain groups because of their opinions). Of course, the
Jacobins, who led the government at the time, were also revolutionaries, and gradually
"terrorism" came to signify violent revolutionary activity in general. The first uses of
“terrorism” referring to struggle against a government were in 1866 in Ireland and 1883 in
3
4

Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 12.
Elshtain, 18.
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Russia. Since then, people have called many different kinds of action terrorism, often because
of public sentiment. For example, Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat was a terrorist, but now is
not. Jerry Adams of Ireland's Sinn Fein and Nelson Mandela of South Africa were terrorists,
now they are statesmen. Terrorism is conceptually ambiguous in public debate, which opens
up the possibility for people to use it as a tool of propaganda. The difficulty in defining
terrorism is a consequence of the negative connotations the public applies to the term.
Because the public intuitively thinks terrorism is evil, they call the act they consider evil
“terrorism” to enhance their claim. Once we acknowledge that flippant usage of the term
signifies no specific activity, we can develop a working definition of terrorism and then
evaluate that activity.
Today, terrorism is still a politically loaded term. For example, the BBC refuses to
use the term because of negative connotations associated with it and a lack of acceptable
definition. 5 Others use the term to draw attention to their cause. For example, some union
activists call the unsafe working conditions in third world nations “corporate terrorism.” 6 In
political circles, a powerful state that wants to condemn certain actions designates these
actions as terrorism; people who want to condemn the state’s actions also equate these actions
to terrorism. Philip Jenkins explains that the latter is the perspective of the “Marxist Vision.” 7
The Marxist Vision maintains that the exploitation of the weak is the foundation of
capitalism in a manner that makes state terrorism commonplace; therefore, when the state
claims that an action directed against the state is terrorism, they claim so hypocritically.
Jenkins remarks that this perspective is evident today in the view that the West commits the

5

Jenkins, 18.
Ibid., 18. Also note the examples given in footnote 1.
7
Ibid., 19-20.
6
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most terrorism and that it claims that the non-West is terrorist to justify its own actions.
Regardless whether or not this perspective is sound, it brings to light a possible reason why,
collectively, nations have not developed a definition of terrorism. A common definition of
terrorism would force some nations to retrospectively call themselves a terrorist state.
Instead, the international community primarily considers that terrorism is self-evident.
National leaders largely have given up on a formal definition of terrorism and tend to
believe that people know terrorism when they see it. For example, the United Nations
Resolution 1368, introduced on 12 September 2001, takes this approach. The first official
international description of a terrorist attack was in this resolution, but its definition of
terrorism just states that terrorism is a threat to international peace and security. 8 The
description did nothing to help us understand what activity is terrorism. Accepting that
terrorism is self-evident only caters to our strong objections to “terrorism”; however, doing so
tells us nothing about to what we are objecting. A working definition is necessary for both
political and philosophical uses. We must know what terrorism is to evaluate specific terrorist
acts because without a definition, we would judge all terrorism unjust simply because of our
emotional attitudes toward the term.
Without a formal definition, we inappropriately label certain acts as terrorism. For
example, following 11 September 2001, the United States declared a “war on terrorism.”
Some people opposed the declaration because they believed that the United States’ record of
terrorism made it an illegitimate candidate for condemning terrorism. Noam Chomsky is
representative of this group. He claims that the United States is the only nation that the
international court condemned for practicing terrorism and we should consider this fact when
8

Press Release SC/7143, Security Council 4370th Meeting.
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we evaluate terrorist acts against the United States. 9 Jenkins explains that the court
condemned the United States for using unlawful force in Nicaragua, but never for using
terrorism; however, others have taken notice that Chomsky implicitly justifies terrorism by
presuming that one nation’s use of terrorism mitigates the injustice of terrorism used against
that nation. They argue that regardless of past events, if a present event is terrorism, one must
treat it as such. Throughout this debate, terrorism nonetheless remained a label referring to all
kinds of enemy violence.
The arbitrary labeling of activity as terrorism allows people to believe that “one man’s
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” When used this way, terrorism refers to cause, not
actions, because the labeler implies that the “terrorist” does not have legitimate grounds for
action. By ignoring the actual action of the “terrorist,” the labeler allows the labeled to show
that the term applied to him is improper and thereby justifies, perhaps inappropriately, his
actions. We must reject the parallel between freedom fighter and terrorist in a formal
definition of terrorism because “freedom fighter” refers to an agent’s cause and “terrorist”
refers to an agent’s strategy. A terrorist’s cause can be just, but if a terrorist’s means are
unjust, then the terrorist is unjust; therefore, even if terrorists’ actions are unjust, they are still
considered freedom fighters if they have just cause. Because terrorism is a strategy in war,
not a cause for war, if the means a terrorist uses are unjust, then he is unjust.

Terrorism Defined
Although people commonly use terrorism to intensify an act’s negative connotations,
in doing so, they specify terroristic traits of an act. They generally provide explanation for

9

Jenkins, 21.
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their intuitions that identifies some horrible attribute to designate why the act is terrorism. 10
Relying on intuitions alone presupposes that terrorism is unjust because people label any act
they dislike “terrorism.” Terrorism is not a pejorative; people inappropriately identify
terrorism because terrorism to a specific kind of strategy. Although people’s intuitions often
are misleading, explanations for their intuitions supply us with a starting point to examine
what is terrorism. When people give reason for why a certain activity is terrorism, they pick
out one or more of the following attributes in the activity: deliberate or random violence;
political motivation; premeditation; targeting civilians; and causing a group to be fearful.
From these qualities, we can determine what distinguishes terrorism from other violent acts. I
argue that terrorism is the premeditated use, or threat, of violence against noncombatants to
coerce some group through intimidation. Terrorism is distinct from other political violence
because it targets noncombatants; it is a “systematically unsystematic” strategy because it
intentionally targets people who do not know they are targets. 11
According to the “you know it when you see it” definition of terrorism, any act that
one does not approve of may be called terrorism. This definition allows both violent and nonviolent acts to be terrorism (e.g., cyber terrorism, eco-terrorism, corporate terrorism). For
example, C. A. J. Coady claims that an attack on the property of noncombatants is terrorism,
even though it is not as severe as attacks on life. 12 Even assuming that there is some
distinction between a trivial attack and a terrorist attack on property, including non-life
threatening acts overextends the definition of terrorism. Terrorists intend to create a panic
among those attacked, which will occur by fear of violence only. Coady is correct that

10

Refer to footnote 1 for examples.
Baur, 14.
12
Coady, 7.
11
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terrorism includes attacks on property and that they are not as severe as attacks on life;
however, not all attacks on property are terrorism. Terrorism must threaten people’s lives; so
on the one hand, if an attack on property threatens one’s life, then it is terrorism. 13 On the
other hand, if an attack on property does not threaten life, it is not terrorism. For example, it
is terrorism to destroy all the available crops in an area because in doing so the attack
threatens the people of that area with starvation, but destroying goods that are unnecessary to
human survival is not terrorism because it does not produce panic.
Some people claim that acts of domestic violent crime are terrorism because they
emphasize terrorism’s violent quality. This “terrorism” harms a person, but these “terrorists”
do not hope to influence some greater goal. For example, Goldenflame uses the terms sexual
terrorist and sexual predator interchangeably in his book Overcoming Sexual Terrorism, but
this interpretation treats terrorism as an adjective picking out the intensity of an act. It allows
any type of violence described as malicious to be terrorism. Although the public’s reactions
to domestic violent crime are often the same as their reactions to terrorism, terrorism is
different because terrorists’ agenda is to affect some greater cause. All terrorists act to
intimidate someone else into doing some political, religious, or social act that they would not
do otherwise. 14
Terrorist acts are not accidents or crimes of passion. All terrorist acts are
premeditated. An accident or act of emotion is not the same as a prior decided act. If
someone accidentally launches a weapon because of a technical malfunction, the act is not
premeditated. It differs from a situation in which the agent launched the weapon

13

Primoratz, 17 and 21.
This feature of terrorism distinguishes terrorism from domestic violent crime, not from other political
violence.
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purposefully. If the act in question is the bombing of a building and the actor’s intended
target is the building adjacent to the actual building hit, the act of bombing that specific
building is premeditated because the actor intended to hit another building. 15 Similarly, if in a
moment of rage an individual destroys a building by driving his vehicle into it, the individual
does not decide prior to the event to cause the destruction; thus, the act is not terrorism.
Terrorism is distinct from other forms of political violence because terrorists target an
unprepared group of individuals. Terrorists succeed by causing fear because of the
indiscriminate nature of the fear itself. Terrorism is discriminate in the sense that it is random
because terrorists target people who will best further their end. Terrorists are politically
motivated, so they select people or representatives of groups whose deaths they believe will
serve their political goals best. The targeted people do not know that they are the target
because terrorism is nonindividualized—anyone in a group can be the victim from the
perspective of the members of the group. In this sense, terrorism is indiscriminate because it
is “systematically unsystematic.” 16 Terrorism is unsystematic because specific individuals
are aware that they are targets and is systematic because terrorists intentionally use terrorism’s
nonindividualized nature to maximize fear.
Additionally, terrorism is indiscriminate in the sense that terrorists do not discriminate
between combatants and noncombatants. 17 Intuitively, many people think political terrorism
is wrong because it targets noncombatants. Whether or not this feature causes terrorism to be
unjust, all terrorists target noncombatants. An attack on military personnel on active duty is
not terrorism because those attacked know that an attack is possible and are prepared for
15

Pillar, 13.
Baur, 14.
17
I clarify the term “noncombatants” in the “Terrorists harm innocents” section. For now, it is enough to define
combatants as the actors who do the violence and noncombatants as everyone else.
16
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defense. Historically, revolutionaries emphasize the element of targeting noncombatants in
terrorism to claim that all violent state activity aimed toward a revolutionary movement is
terrorism because actors in a revolution generally are not uniformed military; however, when
actors are attacking others, they are combatants because they are the source of the threat of
harm.
Terrorists have direct and indirect targets. 18 The latter mentioned here are the enemies
that terrorists demand must do something they would not do otherwise. Terrorists claim that
these targets are guilty of some alleged injustice against them. The direct, or immediate,
targets are the people that terrorists kill or threaten to kill in order to intimidate the indirect
targets. Some terrorists claim that their direct targets are guilty because they have some
association with the indirect target, thereby are tacit supporters of the indirect targets. In this
case, the direct targets are allegedly responsible for the alleged injustice. Whether or not this
is true, indirect targets do not expect the attack because they have not agreed to be
combatants. 19
F. M. Kamm claims that terrorism includes the targeting of combatants when the aim
in killing a combatant is to coerce the group for whom he is fighting to surrender. 20 If this
characteristic were true of terrorism, then it would not be distinct from conventional acts of
war. Although it is possible to kill a soldier in an unconventional manner in a conventional
war, soldiers accept risk to their life and are not immune to attack. Whereas combatants
accept the responsibility for the injustice of their group, noncombatants do not; therefore, one
who targets a combatant is not a terrorist because he does not disregard any immunity.

18

Primoratz, 17 and Baur, 10-11.
I discuss the innocence of indirect targets in the “Terrorists harm innocents” section.
20
Kamm, 658.
19
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Another distinction between terrorism and other forms of political violence is its effect
of spreading fear; it is terrorism. But, Coady argues that the goal of causing extreme fear
should not be included in a definition of terrorism because terrorism may spread anger instead
of fear. 21 He explains that the goal of terrorism is to coerce a group, regardless of doing so
through fear of further attacks or anger about the attack. For the purposes of a definition of
terrorism, this distinction is irrelevant because both anger and fear cause coercion, which is
terrorists’ goal. Coady also contends that all warfare instills anger or fear into enemies so that
they will surrender or negotiate. 22 He explains that in conventional warfare, the purpose of
using overwhelming force is to intimidate the enemy leaders so that they will want a timely
end to the war to save the lives of their soldiers. Coady is correct that the goal of
conventional war is often to make the enemy surrender by using overwhelming force;
therefore, although all terrorists desire to coerce some group into acting, the goal of coercion
is not limited to terrorism. However, spreading of fear into entire populations is a distinct
feature of terrorism. Terrorism causes people associated with a targeted group to fear they
will be the next targets. This fear is not characteristic of conventional war because ordinary
citizens know they are not targets, so do not fear that combatants will harm them.
The threat of terrorism is also terrorism. The threat itself frightens a group by making
it know that they intend to harm noncombatants. A threat of terrorism can be as effective as
an act of terrorism because both can coerce the group into doing something by frightening the
members of the group. If we do not accept terrorism as a just war strategy, then the threats of
future terrorist attacks is not just.

21
22

Coady, 6.
Ibid, 9.
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Based on these features, we can define terrorism as the actual use or threat of
premeditated violence against noncombatants to coerce a group into some course of action.
This definition avoids using terrorism to describe violence that one disagrees because it
identifies a specific strategy. In addition, this definition prevents overextending terrorism to
nonviolent acts that have no effect on a larger group.
When we define terrorism by intuition, terrorism is a tool of propaganda because it
enables anyone to call any “wrong” activity terrorism. Because people differ in what they
intuitively believe are legitimate actions, this definition allows one man’s terrorist to be
another man’s freedom fighter. As a pejorative, the public deems terrorism unjust before any
evaluation of the features of terrorism occurs. By defining terrorism as an act that uses, or
threatens to use, premeditated violence against noncombatants to coerce a group into some
course of action, the debate over the justness of terrorism is about the relevant features of a
terrorist act. Because we know what terrorism is, we can now evaluate the features of
terrorism and the war on terrorism. One has a legitimate reason to respond to terrorism if the
features of the terrorist act are unjust.

13

CHAPTER 2
IS THE WAR ON TERRORISM JUST?
To evaluate the Bush administration’s war on terrorism, we must use the resources of
JWT because the war on terrorism is not a war against an activity that is unjust without
evaluation. I argue that victims of terrorism have just cause to respond to terrorism because
terrorists use unjust means; however, in the current war on terrorism, the Bush administration
does not always use just means to pursue the just cause for war.
To prosecute my argument, I present Michael Walzer’s JWT, which is the foremost
standard in philosophy for judging conventional war. The obvious objection to using JWT to
evaluate terrorism is that terrorism is not a conventional war strategy. I contend, however,
that terrorism is in fact an act of war and that JWT theory applies. I show this by explaining
that an organized group directs or is the target of all acts of war; so, because terrorism targets
an organized group indirectly, terrorism is an act of war.
Walzer specifies rules for conduct in war and rules for causes in war. He contends
that having just cause and using just conduct are necessary to fight a just war. I argue that
terrorism is unjust because terrorists violate the rules for conduct in war by harming innocents
intentionally. Terrorists pursue their cause by trying to harm people who are not responsible
for the alleged injustices they suffer. Because terrorism is unjust and no excuse or apology
mitigates the injustice of terrorism, victims of terrorism have just cause for war. I argue that
just response to terrorism requires proportionality and discrimination. Just response to
terrorism avoids and minimizes civilian risk in achieving military objectives and does not
target people or groups who are not responsible for terrorism. I explain that the Bush

14

administration’s war on terrorism includes just and unjust military engagements. Although
there is just cause to respond to terrorism, the administration does not always follow the limits
to just response.

Just War Theory
Walzer developed a contemporary version of just war theory to evaluate military
conflict between nation-states. According to Walzer, a just response is response only to an
unjust threat. In this section, I first explain Walzer’s JWT criteria. I argue that Walzer’s rules
for just conduct and just causes apply to terrorism because organized groups are targets of
both conventional war and terrorism. Because terrorism is a specific strategy in war, JWT
provides the resources needed to evaluate the war on terrorism. If terrorism is legitimate, then
victims of terrorism do not have just cause to respond.
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars is the seminal text for JWT today. He maintains that a
just war’s cause is to preserve legitimate nation-states and the means used do not intend
unnecessary harm. He writes, “Jus ad bellum requires us to make judgments about aggression
and self-defense; jus in bello about the observance or violation of the customary and positive
rules of engagement.” 23 A just act of war must meet both conditions. Walzer argues that
there are rules for when and whom a solider can kill. If a soldier observes these rules, the
means a soldier uses are just. Walzer also explains that a just cause for war must meet the
nine principles of his theory of aggression. The only just cause for war, according to Walzer,
is response to an unjust aggressor; therefore, if the war on terrorism is just, the United States
must have just cause for the response and must use just means in the response. I argue that
terrorists’ means violate the rules for conduct in war; and hence, that terrorism is unjust.
23

Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 21.
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Because terrorists’ means are unjust, according to Walzer’s criteria, victims of terrorism have
just cause to response.

Rules for Conduct in War
Walzer writes that two sets of rules apply to the conduct of soldiers in war. 24 For a
soldier’s actions to be just, he must not violate either rule. The first set of rules is about when
and how soldiers kill. Walzer explains that soldiers in the war must uphold any limit of this
kind agreed upon by all parties engaged. 25 Not all wars observe the same rules of this type
because when and how soldiers can kill is contingent to the circumstances of individual wars.
If either side violates these rules, the other can violate them as well.
The second set of rules is Walzer’s principal concern. These rules regard whom a
soldier can justly kill. Walzer argues that unlike the first set of rules, the substance of the
second set is not relative to the circumstances of particular wars. The general purpose of the
second set of rules is for soldiers to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants.
“Though the details vary from place to place, these rules point to the general conception of
war as a combat between combatants . . . [We should avoid harming people who] are not
currently engaged in the business of war.” 26 Whereas it is legitimate for soldiers to kill
combatants because combatants train for war and agree to fight, it is not legitimate to kill
noncombatants because they do not engage militarily. Walzer explains that the specific rules
of this set may differ among cultures, but the foundation of all is the immunity of
noncombatants. In war, one violates the second set of rules when he harms noncombatants in

24

Ibid., 41-43.
Ibid., 42.
26
Ibid., 42-23.
25
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the manner that we determine is unjust. Therefore, we must decide what the immunity of
noncombatants requires of combatants to determine if some combatant violates it. 27
Together, these two sets of rules comprise the war convention. Walzer recognizes that
the way we judge acts determine the rules. The second set of rules is significant for
evaluating terrorism because all terrorism harms noncombatants. How we describe the
immunity of noncombatants will determine if a response to terrorism is just. If terrorism
violates the immunity of noncombatants, then the victims of terrorism have just cause to
respond.

Rules for Causes for War
In addition to rules for conduct in war, Walzer also argues that we must limit
appropriate causes for war. His theory of aggression is the rules he develops for just cause.
Walzer forms the first six rules for causes for war from the legalist paradigm, which reflects
domestic law and order. He adds three rules to this paradigm to account for international law
and order. These rules protect legitimate nation-states from being the victim of war.
According to the legalist paradigm, which is the “fundamental structure for the moral
comprehension of war,” the theory of aggression has six criteria 28 :
•

First, an international society of independent states exists. Walzer explains that the
values of the people within states determine states; therefore, one should not attack
states for the sake of life or liberty of the members within the states. 29

27

I explain what the second rule requires for just conduct in war when I discuss the conduct of terrorism.
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 61-62.
29
Walzer recognizes that one may have just cause to override the principle of non-intervention, which this
criterion establishes. The second revision to the legalist paradigm accounts for the appropriate cases of
intervention.
28

17

•

Second, law establishes the rights of the members of the international society. Walzer
emphasizes that although the exact rights will be fluid like society, the rights of
territorial integrity and political sovereignty are necessary. He explains, “At any given
moment . . . one can distinguish the territory of one people from that of another and
say something about the scope and limits of sovereignty.” 30 Territorial integrity is the
right for the members of a community to own the land in which they reside. Political
sovereignty is the right for the members of a community to determine the authority
and government under which they will live.

•

Third, aggression, defined as any use or threat of use of force against the political
sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state, is a criminal act. For one to resist
aggression through force justly, the force must be urgently necessary to stop the
aggression.

•

Fourth, aggression justifies a war of self-defense by the victim and a war of law
enforcement by any members of the international society. “The actual decision to join
the fighting remains a unilateral one, best understood by the analogy to the decision of
a private citizen who rushes to help a man or woman attacked on the street.” 31 Walzer
contends that enforcement from the international community is not obligatory, but if
they do help stop aggression, their cause is just.

•

Fifth, only aggression can justify war. The only just war is one that responds to an
unjust aggressor. “There must have actually have been a wrong, and it must actually
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have been received.” 32 Actual or imminent aggression justifies response. Walzer
emphasizes that differences in religion and politics do not justify war.
•

Sixth, after one militarily stops aggression, the victim, or others, can punish the
aggressor for deterrent or restraint. “The domestic maxim is, punish crime to prevent
violence; its international analogue is, punish aggression to prevent war.” 33 Although
Walzer revises the goal of punishment in the third revision, he retains the
permissibility of responding to aggression even when the immediate aggression ends.
Walzer recognizes that a strict legalistic theory of aggression cannot determine all

judgments about justice and injustice during wars. 34 Although the legalist paradigm is a good
place to start, the theory of aggression must be more flexible than a strict interpretation will
allow because international relations are more complex than domestic crime and punishment.
Walzer states there are three necessary revisions to the legalist paradigm. First, he
recognizes that wars begin before any fighting actually occurs. The first use of force does not
always determine the aggressive act:
The general formula must go something like this: states may use military
force in the face of threats of war, whenever the failure to do so would
seriously risk their territorial integrity or political sovereignty. Under
such circumstances, it can fairly be said that they have been forced to fight
and that they are the victims of aggression. 35
If a state fears an inevitable attack, and foreign observers generally agree because of the
inevitable attacker’s moves, the state has legitimate anticipation. If not being the first to strike
would jeopardize their territorial integrity or political independence, a state with legitimate
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anticipation would be able to strike first justly. A strict legalist paradigm is insufficient to
account for what is a serious risk to territorial integrity and political sovereignty because the
risk involves factors that are not the same in every situation.
Second, intervention is just in some cases. Although Walzer emphasizes other states
should not intrude on a nation’s self-determination, if there is “relational ambiguity” between
the community and the government of the community, intervention is just. Walzer explains
that three kinds of intervention are just: If one community is struggling for independence
from another community through military means, a nation can justly intervene to assist the
secessionist movement; if a foreign army already crosses the boundaries of a community, a
nation can justly counter-intervene to balance the prior intervention; and if self-determination
is irrelevant because of mass violations of human rights within a community’s boundaries, a
nation can justly intervene to rescue people from massacre. 36 Walzer observes that
“interventions are so often undertaken for ‘reasons of the state’ that have nothing to do with
self-determination that we have become skeptical of every claim to defend the autonomy of
alien communities.” 37 Although it is ideal to limit acceptable intervention to the three cases,
we should intervene when one of the cases arises. The second revision is necessary to
evaluate the current administration’s war on terrorism because part of the stated cause for
intervention in Iraq was that Saddam Hussein’s regime committed mass human rights
violations.
Walzer’s final revision of the legalist paradigm is that the deterrence or restraint of
aggressors does not require their capture. 38 Walzer writes that the domestic ideals of capture
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and punishment “are unlikely to have significant deterrent effects; they are very likely to
extend rather than restrict the number of people exposed to coercion and risk; and they require
acts of conquest that can only be aimed at entire political communities.” 39 He explains that
the domestic legal paradigm for punishment is not applicable to international society because
in many cases, one cannot capture an aggressor and in international relations, punishment
must consider more than aggressive acts (e.g., relations between nations and reliability of
intelligence concerning the aggressor). A nation must determine the punishment for an unjust
act by deciding how to stop the aggressor from acting, how to restore the negative effects of
the aggression, and how to reasonably prevent the aggressor from acting similarly again. For
Walzer, because what one determines is appropriate will differ from situation to situation and
is not analogous to domestic aggression, we must alter the legalist paradigm to account for
how to react to unjust wars.
In his theory of aggression, Walzer argues that the only just cause for war is to protect
a legitimate nation-state from unjust aggression. 40 A nation-state is illegitimate when the
members of the state are unable to achieve self-determination because of the actions of the
nation’s leaders. If a nation-state is legitimate then any act of aggression toward it is unjust
and the nation-state should respond militarily.
Walzer writes that one cannot violate the war convention to advance a just cause
because “the rights of innocent people have the same moral effectiveness in the face of just
and in the face of unjust soldiers.” 41 In a just war, combatants have just cause and use just
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means. This requirement for just wars is why defining the war convention is essential.
Although I will address the second rule in a later section, its connection to just cause in a just
war is significant for Walzer. If no wars adhere to the war convention’s requirements, then no
war is just. Because all war has some civilian risk, it seems that all wars violate the second
set of rules in the war convention necessarily. However, adhering to the rule for
noncombatant immunity does not mean that one cannot harm noncombatants; it only means
that one must try to avoid harming noncombatants. Consequently, some wars are just because
they try to minimize civilian risk.
According to Walzer’s theory of aggression and rules for just conduct, a response to
terrorism is just only if terrorism is an act of aggression or violates the rules for just conduct.
Terrorism violates the rules for just conduct if it uses unjust means to further its cause. If the
conduct of terrorism is unjust, if terrorists violate the immunity of noncombatants, then
victims of terrorism and the international community should respond.

Is Terrorism Just?
Terrorism is a specific strategy in war; it is not a specific cause for war. The causes
for terrorism are the same ones actors have in conventional wars. Any conventional soldier
becomes a terrorist when he intentionally harms noncombatants. Consequently, terrorism is
unjust if terrorists violate the rules of conduct. To evaluate the justice of terrorism, we must
address two issues. First, we must decide if JWT is applicable to terrorism. If terrorism is not
an aggressive act of war, then the standards that apply to war are not pertinent to an
evaluation of terrorism. Second, we must evaluate the conduct of terrorism. If the manner in
which terrorists harm people is unjust, then terrorism is unjust. I argue that terrorism is an act
of war and therefore under the purview of just war theory. Terrorism is an act of war because

22

terrorists target organized groups indirectly by harming members within the groups. I argue
that terrorists violate the immunity of noncombatants, so terrorism is unjust. Terrorists violate
the immunity of noncombatants because they intentionally target people who are not
responsible for alleged injustices suffered.

Terrorism Is an Act of War
Walzer primarily intended his JWT to evaluate conventional acts in war, not
unconventional acts like terrorism. If terrorism is not an act of war, then we cannot use JWT
to evaluate it. Instead, domestic or international legal systems should judge terrorism. I
contend that although terrorism may be an irregular act of war, it is nevertheless an act of war.
Terrorism is a criminal activity, but legal systems are unable to evaluate terrorism. Domestic
legal systems cannot adjudicate international acts and international law does not apply to nonstate actors; therefore, JWT is an appropriate standard to evaluate terrorism.
If terrorism is unjust, terrorists are criminals because they commit murder; however,
this is not the view that terrorists necessarily have of themselves. 42 Some terrorists believe
that they kill people in self-defense. For example, religious terrorists view themselves as
martyrs, people who are killed for their faith, when they kill themselves in the process of
committing terrorism. This interpretation is incorrect because other agents do not kill
terrorists because of what they believe. When terrorists die because of their terrorism, they
kill themselves because of what others believe or do. They are not martyrs; they are
murderers. 43 When terrorists die from a military response to aggression, soldiers kill them
because of their terrorist acts, not their beliefs. People who disagree with their faith kill
42
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martyrs; therefore, if terrorists were martyrs, others would kill them because of their religious
convictions. The only case where this seemingly applies is to suicide terrorism; however,
others do not kill suicide terrorists because of their beliefs—suicide terrorists kill themselves
as a means of killing others. The people killed by terrorists are closer to being martyrs than
terrorists themselves because victims of terrorism die because of their association to some
belief or act. If terrorists unjustifiably kill, they commit murder and so are criminals;
however, criminal activities may be acts of war.
Terrorism is different from domestic criminality and traditional war. Elshtain
maintains that terrorism is neither domestic crime nor traditional war because terrorists act
internationally and without declaration of war by an official government. 44 She explains
domestic legal systems cannot regulate international terrorism and because most terrorism is
not state sponsored, international law does not apply. Elshtain is correct that often terrorism
is distinct from what these systems typically regulate; however, we should respond to
terrorism with both systems. If terrorism is unjust, we should respond to it as if it is both a
criminal act and an act of war. 45 If terrorism is just, then it is not criminal in the same sense
that killing someone in self-defense is not criminal. 46 If unjust, terrorist acts are criminal
because they result in intentional harm in the same sense that murder or assault is criminal.
Like conventional acts in war, if terrorism violates rules for conduct, we must hold the actors
responsible for their unjust acts. If the actors are not fellow citizens or states, domestic and
international legal systems are not sufficient, so we need a different standard to judge
terrorism.
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JWT is the appropriate standard because while its foundation is the legal paradigm, it
also recognizes that revisions are necessary for the legal paradigm to account for aggression.
When an unjust act is committed, response and punishment is just. JWT treats acts of
aggression similar to how legal systems treat crime, but on an international scale:
[JWT] controls the extent to which a citizenry is victimized by criminal
acts. It rewards the perpetrator proportionately with consequences
befitting the crime. And it forces both the offender(s) and potential
offenders to reflect on the grievous nature of the crime. 47
By applying JWT, if terrorism is an unjust act, it deserves consequences that befit its injustice.
JWT requires that we hold unjust actors responsible for their unjust acts by eliminating their
ability to act again. In the case of terrorism, we should find the actors responsible for
terrorism and prevent them from acting again.
Generally, either states direct wars or wars are directed at states. “While many
modern wars are the work of ragtag armies of rebels and angry irregulars, these halforganized forces tend to direct their violent efforts against the various faces of the states they
live near or within.” 48 Consequently, terrorism is an act of war when it is the strategy of a
state or the strategy of some group toward a state; however, by definition, terrorists direct
their violence toward organized groups, which are not necessarily states. 49 Although the
targeted group is not always a state, the organization of the group has the same relevant
features as a state. The members in the group determine the group’s legitimacy because they
agree with the group’s structure and direction. Terrorists target members in the group to
coerce the group’s leaders into changing some course of action. Therefore, even when not
directed toward a state, terrorism is an act of war.
47
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Terrorist acts are acts of war because they target some organized group, even if some
terrorists are not organized groups. Temes explains that there are two different perspectives
of war: the tribal perspective and the modern perspective. 50 First, the ancient or tribal
perspective views wars as a conflict between individuals. The perspective of the soldier, not
the group, is what is relevant in evaluating wars. Temes illustrates the tribal perspective
through the story of Gilgamesh.
Like so many ancient epics, the epic of Gilgamesh tells the story of battle
as the story of one man’s character. The wars recounted in the epic are
expressions of the bad character of Gilgamesh and the response to him of
men and gods … a warrior’s arrogance sets the stage for tales of fighting,
death, and the characters of a few good men. 51
The tribal perspective assumes that wars are constant and so one cannot morally evaluate
causes for war; only the individuals’ actions in war are subject to moral evaluation. From this
perspective, war is how an individual defines himself. The possibility for an unjust cause is
inconsistent with this perspective. War is a natural state of affairs, so the conduct of
individuals is all we can evaluate.
The modern perspective shows that when evaluating wars, one views actions as from
the group, not from specific individuals. This perspective
brings the state into the center of war’s meanings and enlarges the moral
scale of war dramatically. War today is generally seen as a theatre of
abstractions in conflict: states, civilizations, and even ideas themselves are
the central actors. 52
In the modern perspective, an act of war is an act of the group. Whereas one can evaluate just
cause for war, just conduct by individuals in war is irrelevant because individuals’ acts are the
will of the group. The group is responsible for individuals’ conduct, but individuals are not.
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Terrorists accept the modern perspective of war because they view moral obligation as
applicable only to the group they target. Because some group is unjust in their eyes, terrorists
believe it is necessary to punish that group with whatever means are available. However, we
must evaluate war from both perspectives. Individual actors are responsible for their conduct
and groups are responsible for their decisions. Even if a terrorist has a legitimate cause for
war, he must use just means; therefore, when terrorists act, their acts are just if they use just
conduct and have just causes for war. This means that the standards of the JWT are
applicable to terrorism because even though terrorism may be criminal, if it is, it is a criminal
act of war.
JWT is pertinent to evaluating terrorism because terrorists target some organized
group indirectly. Although their direct targets are people associated with the group, terrorists
target these individuals only as a means to coerce the group into acting in some way that it
would not act otherwise. Since I have shown that we can evaluate terrorism by applying
JWT, we are now able to do just that. The following section takes up the very evaluation of
terrorism. I contend that terrorism is unjust because of the means all terrorists use to advance
their cause.

Terrorists Use Unjust Means
All terrorists harm noncombatants intentionally as the means to achieve their goal;
therefore, if terrorism is just, the rules of conduct in war allow harming noncombatants
intentionally. We must examine how the immunity of noncombatants limits acts of war to
determine if terrorists violate this rule. Terrorists do not violate the immunity of
noncombatants if one or more of the following is true. First, terrorists’ direct victims are
guilty of the alleged injustices terrorists suffer. I argue that victims of terrorism are

27

noncombatants because they do not agree to risk their lives and are innocent of the alleged
injustice. Second, intentionally harming noncombatants is acceptable conduct in war. I argue
that terrorists intentionally harm innocents in a manner that is distinct from conventional
warfare. Whereas just conduct tries to minimize or avoid harm to innocents, terrorists try to
maximize harm to innocents and therefore act unjustly.

Terrorists Harm Innocents
By definition, terrorists intentionally harm noncombatants; therefore, if intentionally
harming noncombatants is acceptable conduct, then terrorism is just. In this section, I address
the notion of noncombatant; if terrorists harm people who are guilty of some perceived
injustice, then terrorism is just because they do not harm innocents. I argue that terrorists
harm people who do not threaten them directly. I argue that terrorists’ victims are innocent
for two reasons. First, the people harmed are not prepared to defend themselves and do not
agree to risk their life for the group’s alleged injustice. In war different agents have different
degrees of violability (the degree to which others permissibly harm them), which terrorists do
not recognize. Second, the people harmed are not responsible for the alleged injustice
directly. I contend that even if the people harmed are responsible for the injustice indirectly,
they are innocent and should not be harmed.
Although we commonly think of noncombatants as civilians or inactive military
personnel, we must clarify this term for an evaluation of terrorist acts. Terrorists intend to kill
people who are not prepared to defend themselves in order to produce fear in others that
terrorists will kill them next. The fear terrorists create is possible only because terrorists
violate the accepted rules of conduct. Fear results from terrorism because people perceiving
themselves as potential future victims; before terrorists targeted their group, they did not view
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themselves this way because the rules for war protected them from harm. 53 If all people
associated with the “bad” group are guilty of the acts of that group, terrorists are not killing
innocents; however, if there is a distinction between combatants and noncombatants, terrorist
means are unjust and it is acceptable to respond to a terrorist act because it is an unjust act of
war.
Some people claim that civilians are not immune to the threat of death in war. 54 They
argue that wars must be as quick as possible so that the least destruction takes place. In this
thinking, there is no purpose to war, so we should avoid war at all costs and if faced with war,
use whatever means will end it sooner. If the only goal in war is to end it, just war is the most
efficient war. Any effective means are just, including treating enemy civilians as enemy
combatants. The flaw in this argument is that it assumes that during the absence of war, we
are in a state of peace; however, in war, the goal is not for it to end, the goal is to produce a
just peace. A just peace occurs only when just means defeat an unjust aggressor. If one
allows aggression to continue, even though there is no war, the absence of war is not a state of
just peace.
Terrorists target people who do not agree to risk their lives. In traditional warfare, a
combatant is one who actively fights in a war. A combatant agrees to put herself in danger to
respond to some threat. By definition, terrorists target non-combatants. Some terrorists claim
that these noncombatants are culpable for the perceived injustice of the group they are
associated with, so they are not immune from attack. For example, the group, Hizbullah, uses
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terrorism to force companies to cease business with certain governments and to stop people
from supporting these businesses. 55 These terrorists perceive their targets as guilty by
association. Charles explains,
Terrorism is an indirect form of engaging the enemy…it is not merely
random murder but the assassination of innocent noncombatants that
distinguishes terrorism. It deliberately crosses the line, demarcated by
just-war thinking, between combatants and noncombatants. Gone is any
distinction between soldiers and nonsoldiers, between innocents and those
fighting in a conventional (wartime) sense. 56
Because some terrorists claim that noncombatants are guilty of an alleged injustice, they treat
them as if they were combatants. But even though these terrorists treat noncombatants as
combatants, they are aware that others perceive the targets as innocents.
Terrorists deliberately cross the line of traditional warfare to draw attention to their
cause. They are aware that the people they target are not acceptable targets in traditional
warfare because they violate the rules of war to spread fear in the group targeted. For
example, referring to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Osama bin Laden
declared:
There is America, hit by God in one of its softest spots. Its greatest
buildings were destroyed, thank God for that. There is America, full of
fear from its north to its south, from its west to its east. Thank God for
that. What America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to
what we have tasted for scores of years. Our nation (the Islamic world)
has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation for more than 80
years. Its sons are killed, its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked,
and no one hears and no one heeds . . . To America, I say only a few
words to it and its people. I swear by God, who has elevated the skies
without pillars, neither America nor the people who live in it will dream
of security before we live it in Palestine, and not before all the infidel
armies leave the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him. 57
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Al Qa’ida’s goal on September 11, 2001, was to destroy American sense of security by
causing all American citizens to fear that they would become the next targets of terrorism.
Only by violating the rules of just conduct could al Qa’ida spread “humiliation” throughout
the United States. Implicit in bin Laden’s statement is recognition that the attack violated the
rules of war because he compares it to what he claims is unjust aggression against civilians
that “we have tasted for scores of years.” According to Walzer’s rules for conduct, a just war
requires distinguishing between noncombatants and combatants, but where does that
distinction lie? 58
F. M. Kamm distinguishes combatants and noncombatants by degrees of violability. 59
She writes that combatants are more violable than noncombatants, but also that the
inviolability of one’s fellow noncombatants, the enemy’s noncombatants, and neutrals differs.
Kamm uses the example that acts of war between two countries should not affect the citizens
of neutral countries; therefore, she agrees that there is a rule of war that distinguishes the
degree of inviolability between different noncombatants and combatants.
Kamm explains that we should uphold violability ratios among different types of
agents in acts of war. A country determines the ratios independently; therefore, if one looks
to the point of view of different countries, the ratios will change. Kamm writes,
For suppose that the war A is fighting is unjust and A knows it, but A
should not stop fighting because this would have an even worse effect
from the point of view of justice given that the war has started. Then, I
believe, its own combatants and noncombatants have greater
responsibility to shoulder burdens of war than do those of B, and A should
know this. 60
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Kamm argues that because a country has a duty to care for its own citizens, the inviolability
of combatants and noncombatants in that country is higher than the inviolability of
combatants in the enemy’s country; however, because combatants are more violable than
noncombatants, a country’s own combatants are more violable than the enemy’s
noncombatants. Furthermore, the inviolability of a country’s noncombatants is lower than the
inviolability of citizens in neutral countries because the engaged parties must absorb all the
costs of war. The order of violability for the just side from most inviolable to most violable is
neutrals, fellow noncombatants, enemy noncombatants, fellow combatants, and enemy
combatants. The unjust side’s combatants and noncombatants must bear more of the burden
than the just side must bear. Kamm explains that this responsibility does not contradict a
country’s duty to care for its citizens because a concern that your citizens not bring unjust
harm on others replaces the duty to care for your citizens.
Kamm argues that a nation can put its citizens in danger because it is acting on behalf
of the collective.
Citizens are to accept these risk and harms in wartime for the good of the
collective of which they are apart. Even those, such as children, who have
not yet reaped benefits of being a part of this collective are members of
the collective that is organized to be of service to these children should
they survive. This is justification in term of imposing risks and harms on
people for their own collective good. 61
She contends that citizens are liable to risks imposed on them (although they can also attempt
to resist the harm) both to promote their country’s interests and to stop their country’s
injustice. Citizens are liable to risks to stop their country’s injustice because countries have a
higher duty to be just to other countries. Kamm argues that a state can also put the enemy’s
citizens at risk if the enemy is unjust because the enemy’s citizens are liable to risks to stop
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the unjust act from their country. The risks that a country can put on the enemy’s citizens are
risks that the enemy should impose on its citizens to stop its injustice; thus, she argues that
one should allow terror killing to stop injustice because one has a duty to stop injustice.
Kamm maintains that the most important goal in war is to end an unjust war;
therefore, using “unjust” means is just if less death and destruction results from the act.
Kamm’s argument is problematic because she argues that justice can result from injustice.
Although less death and destruction is always appealing, absence of war should not come at
the price of more injustice. To preserve justice in war, agents’ conduct must be limited. Two
of these constraints are the immunity of innocents and the rejection of the peculiar evil of
spreading terror.
Because there are many choices that have the potential of improving the odds of
winning, we must rule out some choices to make war more than just a matter of expediency.
Because we must fight just wars, we need to eliminate some options. “Necessary action”
cannot simply mean what best improves the odds of winning the war. 62 Necessary action is
action, permissible according to the rules of conduct, that is required to achieve some just
objective. Intentionally killing noncombatants is never “necessary action” because it is not an
acceptable alternative. Because soldiers agree to fight, are trained to fight, and do fight they
are different from noncombatants. A soldier who is aware that he is in danger when fighting
in a war differs from noncombatants who do not agree to be in danger and are not trained to
defend themselves against danger.
Terrorism is unjust because terrorists harm noncombatants, people who are not
responsible for aggression. But, who is responsible for aggression? Responsibility for unjust
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acts varies between decision makers, combatants and civilians. People who make decisions in
war are responsible for unjust acts because they are the source of the injustice. For example,
political leaders are responsible for the effects of their decisions. “They aspire to office,
connive at control and leadership, compete for positions from which they can do evil as well
as good. If they hope to be praised for the good they do, they cannot escape blame for the
evil.” 63 Political leaders are ultimately responsible for their group’s aggression because their
decision is the source of the aggression. If these leaders will not end their groups’ aggression
or negotiate for peaceful settlement, their victims have just cause to overthrow the unjust
regimes.
Combatants are not responsible for their leader’s unjust decisions because they have
no authority over what those decisions are; however, they are responsible for their individual
actions. Combatants justly defend themselves from the immediate threat of harm from other
combatants, but cannot use noncombatants to shield themselves from attack because
noncombatants have not agreed to risk their lives. When combatants agree to fight, they agree
to increase their risk of harm; therefore, when one combatant harms another combatant, the
first acts justly because the other has agreed to the risk.
Whereas I define terrorism as the killing of noncombatants, Kamm writes that in some
cases it is permissible to terror kill combatants. 64 “Terror killing combatants” is killing
soldiers to coerce the group they are associated with into acting in some way. Kamm explains
that although it is permissible in some cases to terror kill noncombatants, one can justify
terror killing combatants in all cases. She explains that if soldiers are attacking with unjust
cause, they need to be used in any way possible to stop the war. The act of killing the soldier
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is permissible as self-defense, so the act remains permissible regardless of if one’s intention is
to terrorize the rest of the population into surrendering. The deaths are already necessary for a
quick end to the war, so intending to cause the deaths is irrelevant.
Kamm is correct that “terror killing combatants” is permissible in war. In war,
soldiers kill enemy soldiers to intimidate the enemy leaders into surrendering or agreeing to
the terms of a ceasefire; however, this act is not terrorism. “Terror killing combatants” is
simply defense against combatants, which is every act in conventional war. Terrorism is
distinct from other violent political activity because terrorism is the intentional killing of
noncombatants to coerce some group by intimidation. If someone kills a combatant in an
unusual manner in war (e.g., torture), the combatant’s fellow citizens are not terrorized
because civilians have no reason to think they will be targeted next and combatants accept the
risk to their lives and can defend themselves.
Civilians are not responsible for the injustice of their leaders. Walzer explains that in
a perfect democracy, the degree to which a citizen supports their nation’s injustice is
responsible for it because their support makes the unjust act possible.65 He argues that in this
society all civilians should:
. . . withdraw his name from this act (the war policy) though not
necessarily from every communal action, for he may still value, as he
probably should, the democracy he and his fellow citizens have achieved .
. . the more one can do, the more one has to do. 66
However, there are no perfect democracies. At most, civilians are responsible only for
electing the officials that make decisions, but are unaware of what decisions these officials
will make in war. Because civilians only have limited participation and are not individually
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responsible for any decision made, they are not responsible for injustice that results from their
leaders’ policies. When some civilians claim to support an unjust act of war, they are not
responsible for the act because they had no part in the decision. “Even patriotic excitement,
war fever, among such people is probably best understood as a reflex of distance, a desperate
identification, stimulated, it may be, by false account of what is going on.” 67 Because
civilians are not a danger to combatants and do not make war decisions, they cannot be
harmed in self-defense and are not responsible for aggression.
Kamm’s violability ratios are correct that innocent third parties are inviolable and that
groups should protect enemy noncombatants at the risk of their own combatants; but, she is
incorrect that it is permissible to terror kill noncombatants. Even if a group could save
members of an innocent group by terror killing an enemy noncombatant, the act is unjust
because all noncombatants are immune from attack. They are not responsible for the alleged
injustice. If a soldier is fighting an unjust war, he can harm enemy combatants because they
are threatening his life. However, all combatants should respect the immunity of
noncombatants because they are not responsible for the threat imposed. The noncombatants
of a nation, its enemy nation, and neutral countries are equally inviolable because they are not
responsible for the unjust aggression. Being responsible for the unjust act is why an actor is
guilty. Just response only harms people who are guilty of the perceived injustice; therefore,
because terrorists harm people who are not responsible, terrorists harm innocents.
The essential distinction between combatants and noncombatants is that the former is
responsible for some threat of harm. Whereas combatants provoke the harm that they suffer,
noncombatants are not an immediate danger, so one must not harm them. In many cases,
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terrorists have to seek out the people they kill; they kill people with whom they have never
interacted. Because terrorists create fear by harming people innocent of the alleged injustice
that they suffer, terrorism violates the rule of noncombatant immunity; however, one could
object that because innocent people die in all war, all war is unjust.68 If this is true, then
because injustice is necessary to enforce peace, terrorism is permissible in spite of it being
unjust. In the following section, I address this objection by examining the distinction between
the intention and unintentional harming of noncombatants.

Terrorists Intentionally Harm Innocents
Terrorists harm noncombatants to advance their causes. By definition, terrorist acts
are premeditated; they intend to kill noncombatants. If intentional killing of noncombatants is
permissible in normal wartime conditions, then terrorism is just. If intentional killing of
noncombatants is necessary in war, then all war is unjust, so terrorist acts are equally
permissible to all other acts in war. The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is the traditional
standard for evaluating permissible killing of noncombatants; however, it is problematic
because it dismisses one’s responsibility for side effect harm. I present Kamm’s solution to
the DDE, which is that an act’s properties, instead of an actor’s intentions, determine the act’s
permissibility. I argue that Kamm’s solution is incorrect because it is not possible to know in
advance specific consequences of actions and that her solution requires terrorism when it will
prevent death. I argue that agents are responsible for side effect harm they cause; therefore, I
favor replacing the DDE with the Doctrine of Double Intention, with the addendum of
demanding use of a suboptimal alternative, because it requires decision makers to choose an
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alternative that possesses less civilian risk. Whereas conventional warfare that harms
innocents can be just, terrorism is unjust.
The difficulty in distinguishing terrorism from conventional warfare is that both cause
noncombatant deaths. War scholars traditionally use the DDE to distinguish ‘strategic’
bombings from ‘terror’ bombings. According to the DDE, it is permissible to act when one
foresees that harm will result from that act if and only if the act contains four elements 69 :
•

First, the intended end is permissible.

•

Second, the intended means to that end is just.

•

Third, one does not intend the foreseen harm.

•

Fourth, the unintended harm is proportionate to the value of the end.

The purpose of the DDE is to deem acts with harmful side effects permissible and acts that
intend the same harm impermissible. This means that I cannot intentionally kill ten civilians
to save twenty civilians, but if I bomb a building to save twenty civilians, even though by
bombing the building I kill ten civilians, my action is just. The DDE judges the permissibility
or impermissibility of actions by the actor’s intentions; therefore, according to the DDE,
terrorism is impermissible because terrorists’ intended end is impermissible harm.
The DDE is not an appropriate measure of permissible noncombatant death; however,
one objection to the DDE does not accurately present its flaw. Kamm argues that the DDE is
insufficient because it does not necessarily minimize overall harm. It is possible that either
intentionally killing one person (unjust under the DDE) or fighting a long war with thousands
of deaths (just under the DDE) achieve the same good. In this situation, more death is the just
scenario, which is unacceptable for Kamm, who remarks that acts that are not normally
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permissible are permissible if they minimize harm more than any other alternative. She
explains that the DDE “sometimes allows as an alternative an act that would not have been
permitted in the first place when the alternative act is the one, of all those that could
reasonably be done, that minimizes the harm that would have been done to the same
person.” 70 For Kamm, if one’s only options were to fight a long war that resulted in many
deaths or to kill intentionally a person that would die in the war in any case, one should kill
the person because he is no worse off and others are better off.
Kamm argues that the properties of an act determine permissibility rather than the
agent’s intent. “One may do a permissible act for a bad reason, not for the sake of the
properties that makes it permissible; hence, the DDE is incorrect because it would declare as
impermissible acts that are permissible.” 71 She explains that the properties of an act
determine what we think the actor intends because we do not know for certain what the actor
intends. If the act does good, we think the actor intended good. If the act does evil, we think
the actor intended evil. An actor may intend an impermissible act, but as long as he has just
cause for action, we should not fault him. According to Kamm, because all that matters is the
property of the act, a terror bombing that intentionally kills one innocent and a tactical
bombing that results in the death of one innocent are equally permissible.
The appeal of Kamm’s argument is that she wants war to end as quickly and painlessly
as possible. It is true that war is never desirable, even if it is better than allowing some harm
to continue. Kamm also agrees that in general killing an innocent civilian is worse than war
and that noncombatants are immune from attack. The point where Kamm diverges is when
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intentionally killing a noncombatant ends some harm and in the future the noncombatant
would die from that harm.
Kamm’s solution to the DDE is problematic because it is impossible to know if a
specific person would die in the harm that his death prevents. One cannot look to the future to
evaluate what one should do in the present because the future is unknown; however, Kamm is
correct in concluding that if the intentional killing of a noncombatant ends some harm and the
noncombatant dies from that harm in the future, then the act is permissible. Without this
feature, an action like the bombing of a tactical plant that will result in civilian causalities is
impermissible because knowing about potential side effect deaths is the same as intending
side effect deaths. When one acts, knowing that a side effect will occur, she intends both the
act and the side effect.
Kamm’s solution assumes that we know all of our actions’ results before we act.
However, general foreseeable acts are distinct from specific foreseeable acts and this
distinction is relevant in evaluating unintended deaths. We can foresee general events that
will result from an action; we can foresee that the bombing of a tactical plant next door to a
school will demolish half of the school. We do not know in advance, however, that a specific
individual will die from the bombing of the tactical plant because unexpected circumstances
may arise that prevent the individual from being in the place where he would die from the
bombing. For example, it is possible for one to foresee that the bombing of a tactical plant
will destroy half of a school as a side effect, but it is not possible to foresee that the bombing
will kill a certain child because he could by chance be in the half of the school unharmed.
Although it is permissible to bomb a tactical plant with the side effect of harming half of a
school, it is not permissible for one intentionally to kill the child in order to prevent the other
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children from dying because one cannot foresee that he will die in the bombing.
Consequently, Kamm’s solution to allow terror killing of individuals that will die anyway is
faulty because we cannot verify that an individual will die in a future event that her death will
prevent.
Combined, Kamm’s arguments inadvertently form an obligation to use terrorism when
it will prevent future deaths. First, Kamm argues that terrorism is permissible. Because the
properties of an act are most important to Kamm, she contends that if we claim that all terror
killing is unjust, we allow what is impermissible in some situations to be permissible in
similar situations. 72 Kamm argues that instead of allowing the impermissible to become
permissible, the permissible should remain permissible in different circumstances; therefore,
terror killing of noncombatants is permissible if a permissible act would kill them anyways. 73
For Kamm, if the DDE permits fighting a long war that kills an agent, it is acceptable to terror
kill that agent because his death is permissible already. Kamm explains that killing the agent
is permissible by another alternative, but terror killing him is a greater good because it ends
the war, so minimizes harm. Likewise, if one persons attack another, it is permissible to kill
the attacker in self-defense; therefore, it is also permissible to terror kill that person to scare
the enemy into surrendering. Second, Kamm argues that actors should use any means to
reduce noncombatant deaths in war. Kamm explains that if it is possible to decrease the
number of noncombatant deaths by killing a smaller number of noncombatants, killing the
smaller number is permissible because the goal is as few as possible noncombatant deaths. 74
Kamm makes a stronger argument than the one she intends to make. For Kamm, not using

72

Ibid., 653.
Ibid., 659.
74
Ibid., 655.
73

41

terror killing is morally problematic if it prevents deaths; therefore, if terror killing an
individual, who dies in the war in any case would prevent deaths, then terror killing that
individual is obligatory. Because, according to Kamm, the only objective in war is to end it,
not only is terror killing permissible, it is required.
We should reject the case Kamm presents by appealing to the distinction between
general and specific foresight and the effects of terror killing. Because one cannot predict an
agent’s death in the future, one cannot justifiably kill him to serve some purpose in the
present; thus, terror killing an individual is never permissible. The difficulty occurs when we
think in terms of general foresight. Terrorism includes harm to property that threatens lives
(e.g., destroying all crops). If we bomb a military base in the middle of all the crops in a
nation, we have general foresight that we will destroy the crops. But does this mean that it is
permissible to destroy all the crops when doing so is not a side effect? In cases of general
foresight, if we accept Kamm’s solution, terrorism is permissible. However, destroying crops
as a side effect is distinct from intentionally destroying all crops because the latter intends to
produce a unique fear in the population. The only possible intentional reason for destroying
all the crops, if it were not a side effect, is to spread fear in the population by threatening
lives. Therefore, the description of an act does not account for all relevant facts about an act.
Because terrorizing a population is a uniquely evil act, it is an unjust means in war. 75
The DDE, insufficiently minimizes harm because unintentional evil too easily results
in evil as a side effect. The DDE only requires that combatants “not try” to harm civilians,
whereas combatants should “try not” to harm combatants. 76 As long as a target is of enough
importance, an act with horrible foreseen side effects is permissible according to the DDE.
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Walzer proposes that we replace the DDE with the Doctrine of Double Intention (DDI). He
argues that instead of disregarding side effect deaths, we should attempt to minimize evil by
increasing risks to combatants because “civilians have a right to something more. And if
saving civilian lives means risking soldier’s lives, the risk must be accepted.” 77 The
difference between acts that result in side effect harm and acts that intend harm is the kind of
intention. The DDI holds that actors should intend to reduce harm to civilians. Actors are
responsible for unintended harm. Although they are not accountable for it, they should not
ignore that it will occur. Instead, actors should attempt to minimize the knowingly
unintended, even though that means putting themselves in danger.
Kamm’s violability ratios support the notion that enemy civilians are more violable
than a combatant’s fellow citizens. This notion is incorrect because immunity comes from
being human. One looses this immunity only when he is responsible for some threat. By
upholding the immunity of enemy civilians, one’s fellow civilians are at greater risk because
doing so lowers the effectiveness of the military action; however, the purpose of principles
governing conduct in war is to limit what is acceptable so that effectiveness is not the only
consideration. 78 Even if double intention makes the war harder to win, one cannot ignore the
humanity of enemy civilians.
Walzer argues that there is nevertheless a limit to the risks soldiers should take to
minimize side effect deaths of civilians. 79 War decisions require only a positive commitment
to save civilian lives. Although Walzer does not explain what this commitment entails,
Steven Lee proposes a method for choosing means that reduce civilian risk. Lee believes that

77

Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 156.
Lee, 238.
79
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 156.
78

43

the commitment to save civilian lives requires combatants to choose an alternative to the
militarily optimal alternative (the alternative that achieves some objective with the least
amount of military cost) that lowers civilian risk. 80 Combatants do not have to choose the
alternative that contains the least civilian risk but the smallest possibility of success; they
must balance the relevant features of all alternatives and choose the option that will achieve
the objective with the least civilian risk.
The appropriate alternative varies according to circumstances; however, all
alternatives contain four relevant features that aid us in choosing the appropriate one. 81 First,
each alternative has a likelihood of success. In most cases, the alternative chosen has a high
likelihood of success; but one should weigh this alternative against the reductions of civilian
risk in alternatives with a lower likelihood of success. This is the second feature of all
alternatives. Each alternative contains some risk to civilians. We should reject alternatives
with higher civilian risk than the militarily optimal alternative. The third feature is the degree
of risk the alternative poses to combatants. To decrease civilian risk, we should accept some
increase in combatant risk and decrease in the likelihood of success. The fourth factor is the
contribution of the objective to the overall war. This is in the assessment because in war, the
stakes are high, so some risk is acceptable. Therefore, if faced with an unjust threat, one has
just cause to respond. However, to be just, one must choose an alternative that minimizes
civilian risk. If nonmilitary alternatives are available that are likely to achieve the objective,
then one should choose these alternatives; however, if nonmilitary alternatives are not
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available, then one should choose a militarily suboptimal alternative. A militarily suboptimal
alternative sacrifices some likelihood of success and an increase in combatant risk to lower
civilian risk. Only then does one not intend to harm noncombatants.
The DDI is preferable to the DDE because we decide what kind of increase in
combatant risk we should use to decrease civilian risk. The DDE accounts for duties that
combatants have to civilians in a manner that allows combatants to disregard the absolute
duty of protecting the innocent. Whereas the DDE holds that if one has an appropriate
intention, an otherwise impermissible act is permissible, the DDI allows an impermissible
alternative in some circumstances to be permissible in others. Because it is not always
possible to avoid civilian deaths, the DDI distinguishes a strategic bombing’s regrettable
civilian death from a terrorist’s celebrated civilian death. It is important that we do not regard
civilian deaths as simply accidents when they are foreseeable because decision makers intend
these “side effects.”
According to the DDI, terrorism is impermissible because it maximizes civilian risk.
Terrorists foresee that they will harm civilians, even if their ultimate goal is something other
than harming them, and do not attempt to reduce civilian risk by the means they employ to
further their end. Terrorism maximizes civilian risk because by that means, terrorists achieve
their goal of coercion. Without purposefully increasing civilian risk, terrorists are unable to
create fear in other members in the group, which is necessary for terrorists to pursue their
ends. Whereas just harm to civilians is harm that the actor attempts to avoid, terrorists
attempt to harm as many civilians as possible to advance their cause.
Because the strategy terrorists use require them to increase civilian risk, collateral
damage in conventional war does not mitigate the impermissibility of terrorism. This,
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coupled with the previous argument, terrorists knowingly violate the war convention to spread
fear, entails that terrorism is unjust. Alleged injustices do not justify terrorism because the
conduct of terrorism is unjust; even if terrorists have just cause, terrorism is never a just
response because terrorists’ means are unjust. Terrorist acts violate the immunity of
noncombatants because terrorists intentionally kill people who the war convention deems
innocent of the perceived or actual guilt of the group targeted. Therefore, terrorism is unjust,
so is an act of aggression and one has just cause to respond to terrorism. We can now
evaluate what JWT demands of a just response to terrorism.

Is the War on Terrorism Just?
According to Walzer’s JWT, victims of terrorism have just cause for responding to
terrorism and for punishing terrorism. I argue that proportionality and discrimination limit
just responses to terrorism. The Bush administration’s “war on terrorism” intends to punish
terrorist attacks and prevent future terrorist attacks from occurring. The United States justly
advanced this cause in Afghanistan, but the war in Iraq was unjust because an alternative that
possessed less civilian risk would achieve the United States’ military objective.

Constraints on Responses to Terrorism
A just response to terrorism and just punishment for terrorism must not violate the
rules for conduct in war or the rules for causes of war. Victims of terrorism have just cause to
respond; however, if some excuse lessens the injustice of terrorism, then victims must
consider the mitigation when they respond to terrorism and perhaps respond with less force.
A response or punishment complies with the rules governing conduct when it is proportional
to the terrorist act and discriminates between people responsible and not responsible for
terrorism.
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Mitigation of Force in Response to Terrorism
One may object to responding to terrorism because some feature inherent in the
circumstances of terrorism excuses its injustice. For example, one could argue that terrorism
is the only alternative for some groups with legitimate cause for war. I argue that no excuse
or apology legitimizes terrorism and that in no circumstances is terrorism permissible.
Although the excuses for terrorism may reflect accurate assessments of the circumstances of
terrorism, none mitigates the evil that terrorism causes.
We have already determined that terrorism is unjust because intentionally killing
innocents is unjust, but to determine what an appropriate response to terrorism is we must
decide if any reasons mitigate the injustice of terrorism for the purposes of mitigating the
response to terrorism’s force. If there is a legitimate reason that weakens the injustice of
terrorism, then force used to respond to terrorism should be proportional to the degree the
excuse mitigates the terrorist. The most common example is that terrorists have just cause. If
we accept that terrorists with just cause can use unjust means, then we should use less force in
response. In the following, I present Walzer’s discussion of apologies that have potential for
excusing terrorism. He concludes that none is applicable because terrorists use unjust means.
He explains that no excuse justifies terrorism because none distinguishes just cause from just
means. Although excuses are better than justifications because they recognize that terrorists
use unjust means, we should eliminate both because they indirectly support terrorist actions
by assuming just means are unnecessary in just war. Walzer identifies four types of excuses
for terrorism, but none excuse the injustice of terrorists’ conduct.
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First, there is the excuse that terrorism is the last resort. 82 Walzer explains that
terrorists are more likely to use terrorism as a first option than a last resort. Even when
terrorists try other options before resorting to terrorism, the excuse that nothing else is
available is just that— an excuse. Even if terrorists have just cause, terrorism is not just.
Walzer explains, “Whatever the cause to which they are committed, we have to recognize
that, given their commitment, the one thing that they cannot do is ‘nothing at all.’” 83 If all
else has failed, the agent should not use terrorism to advance their cause. If nothing else is
feasible, the agent has no more options; however, simply because some action did not work
the first time does not mean it will not work the second, or the tenth, time. In politics,
repetitive acts are often the most effective. There is no way to know that further repetition of
past actions will not result in the desired goal. One must use just means regardless of whether
or not doing so requires them to repeat past attempts at their objective. If a group has used all
available options short of unjust means, then they should stay the course. Not using terrorism
as a first resort does not mitigate the injustice of terrorism when used as a last resort.
The second excuse Walzer addresses is the idea that terrorism is the only strategy
available for struggling national liberation movements. 84 The excused scenario is when a
movement is too weak to defeat an established state. To defend terrorism’s permissibility,
Kamm appeals to this excuse. She argues, “Further, it might be permissible for one side in
conflict to use terror but impermissible for the other side to use it. This is because one side
may have no other means by which to pursue their goal . . .” 85 Although we traditionally
think terrorists are irrational, Kamm contends it is possible that the only means available to
82
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fight a rational agent’s unjust threat is terrorism. An agent may not have access to armed
personnel so he cannot carry out a traditional war. Additionally, it is possible that any other
means (e.g. financial or nonviolent) are unavailable or would be ineffective. The international
community may incorrectly disagree that the agent has just cause, so there is no hope of future
assistance from other groups to advance his cause. In Kamm’s scenario, the agent has just
cause, but no alternative to terrorism; therefore, terrorism is not the last resort, it is the only
available option because the agent does not have resources necessary for other alternatives.
Walzer’s answer to Kamm’s argument is two-fold. 86 First, Walzer explains that
excusing terrorism because terrorists are too weak to defend themselves often confuses the
movement’s weakness with respect to the opposing state and the movement’s weakness with
respect to the people in the state. If a movement is weak because of “the inability of the
movement to mobilize the nation . . . terrorism [is] the ‘only’ option because it effectively
rules out all others: nonviolent resistance, general strikes, mass demonstrations,
unconventional warfare, and so on.” 87 For a movement to defeat a state using any means, the
movement must have some popular support. If the movement is able to mobilize the nation,
then acts involving many people are possible. If the movement does not have popular
support, then the movement should not act because the members of a nation should determine
the nation. If the members of a nation do not agree with a movement’s aims, the movement
should not achieve its goal.
Second, if the movement is weak because the state oppresses any available means, the
movement cannot justly use terrorism. Walzer explains that if terrorism will defeat the state,
other options will as well; therefore, this excuse is the last resort excuse and does not mitigate
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the injustice of terrorism. 88 If there are no means for victims of oppression to take
themselves, they could appeal to the international community for help. If international
community refuses to help, the victims should continue to ask for help and try to defend
themselves justly from the unjust aggression; therefore, even if an established state is
internally aggressive, victims are unjust if they terrorize the members of the state because
those terrorized are morally innocent.
The third excuse is the idea that terrorism works to achieve the goals of the oppressed
without their participation. The excuse is that terrorism is the only act that is effective in
meeting the ends of people who cannot act for themselves. According to Walzer, “But even if
we were to grant some mean-end relationship between terror and national liberation…it must
be possible to say that the desired end could not have been achieved through any other, less
wrongful, means.” 89 He rejects this excuse because it assumes that nothing else is possible.
As explained in response to the national liberation excuse, even the oppressed have
alternatives to intentionally killing innocents. People oppressed may be unable to act for
themselves, but they can ask the international community to act on their behalf by eliminating
their oppressor; therefore, terrorism is not the only option, so this excuse does not mitigate the
injustice of terrorism.
The final excuse Walzer addresses is the idea that terrorism is the universal resort. 90
This excuse assumes that all political action generates fear in innocents. Since terrorism is the
politics of both state officials and movement militias, we should not punish terrorists for using
the same means as legitimate states. Walzer responds, “Officials and militants who live, as it
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were, on the margins of legitimacy and strength sometime choose terrorism and sometimes do
not. Living in terror is not a universal experience. The world the terrorists create has its
entrances and exits.” 91 He explains that legitimate states do not need to terrorize their citizens
the same way popular movements do not need to terrorize their opponents to be effective. If a
state or movement has enough support, it does not need to instill fear into the population, and
if a state or movement does not have enough support, it should not continue; thus, we should
not excuse terrorism because normal activity in legitimate states is not terroristic.
A derivation of this excuse is that because oppression is terroristic, we should excuse
the opponents of oppression’s terrorist acts. If an agent uses terrorism to respond to
oppression’s terror, he is not at fault because “the oppressors set the terms of the struggle.” 92
Walzer responds that if a liberation movement defeats oppression by using terrorism, it does
not change the terms of the oppression. Both tyrants and terrorists disregard the immunity of
the group they condemn, so if terrorists replace tyrants, only the targeted group changes.
Terrorism only reinforces the oppressive acts and undermines the confidence of the oppressed
that there is a way to end the oppression; hence, oppression does not mitigate the injustice of
terrorism because responding to terror with terror only perpetuates the use of unjust means.
Walzer explains that these excuses shroud the decision to commit terrorism when
decision makers view terrorism as an option. Terrorism is an act of aggression, so it is unjust
because it intentionally harms innocent people. When faced with unjust aggression, decision
makers must limit the means they use to respond so that they do not replace aggression with
more aggression. No excuse mitigates the injustice of terrorism because agents with just
cause always have alternatives to terrorism.
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Terrorist acts are unjust, even when one responds to terrorism because one must
respond using just means. Although some terrorists have just cause for action, using a
terrorist strategy is unjust. Because no circumstances mitigate terrorist acts, we must respond
to all terrorism equally in a proportionate and discriminate manner. I argue that in order to
respond proportionately, victims must minimize civilian risk while achieving their objective.
Victims should risk some likelihood of success by choosing an alternative with less civilian
risk. To respond discriminatorily, victims must engage militarily only with people
responsible for the unjust aggression. Before I address how a just response is limited, I
explain the consequences of terrorism. Because terrorism causes entire groups to fear that
they are the next targets, leaders may unjustly respond because they want revenge for their
group’s fear.

Consequences of Terrorism
We should respond proportionately to terrorism, but proportionately to what? To
measure our response, we must understand what terrorism causes populations to experience.
Although the consequences of terrorism vary, all terrorism has immediate effects and gradual
effects. The immediate effects of terrorism are the destruction and devastation caused by
terrorists successfully hitting their direct target. The degree of immediate damage is relative
to the magnitude of the terrorist act. Terrorism also affects victims gradually because it
disrupts civic peace and causes fear in everyday life.
Elshtain maintains that terrorist acts are unjust because terrorists disrupt civic peace.
For Elshtain, this disruption causes people to “retreat behind closed doors” and not to interact
publicly with the group because they fear that if they have such high visibility, they may be
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the next targets. 93 Some terrorists claim that disruption to one’s way of life is not exclusively
a reaction to terrorism. For example, some Islamic terrorists argue that they have a just cause
for war because the West disrupts their culture. Two of al Qa’ida’s goal are to “unite all
Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs.” 94 Osama bin
Laden asserts that in order to reclaim the Islamic way of life, al Qa’ida must overtake all
Muslim governments, eliminate Western influence, and create a single state of Islam.
Insisting that terrorism is unjust because it disrupts civic peace fuels the sentiment of
terrorists. Although Elshtain’s remark is correct that disruption of civic peace is a result of
terrorism, she focuses on tangible effects only. The fear itself is also a distinctive evil of
terrorism.
Walzer argues that terrorism is never permissible because it is a “peculiar evil.” 95
Terrorism forces fear into everyday life by causing insecurity in public and compels people to
look endlessly for precautions. Walzer argues,
The moral difficulty is the same, obviously, when the conspiracy is
directed not against you but against them—Protestants, say, not Catholics;
Israelis, not Italians or Germans; blacks, not whites. These ‘limits’ rarely
hold for long; the logic of terrorism steadily expands the range of
vulnerability…No one is safe once whole populations have been put at
risk. 96
Not only is terrorism a peculiar evil to the person to which it is directed, it also affects people
to which it is not directed because it forces them to question if they will be targeted next. The
unique injustice of terrorism is that it instills fear in the entire group targeted. Terrorists
cannot claim that this unease results from any act to which they have been subjected. Even if
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Islamic terrorists are correct, and the actions of the West do disrupt civic peace in Muslim
nations, the West does not cause all members of these nations to fear that they will die from
some immediate violent threat.
This fear is distinct from the intimidation that all acts of war cause. In conventional
war, combatants from one nation attempt to overwhelm the enemy to force an agreement to
the terms of ceasefire. If fear occurs, it is only of loosing the war to the leaders of the enemy
nation. Ordinary citizens do not fear for their lives in conventional war because they know
that they are not the targets.
To determine what acts are appropriate in response to terrorism, we must refer to the
immediate and the gradual effects of terrorism. By intentionally targeting noncombatants
terrorism disrupts civic peace and causes fear in ordinary life. To prevent future terrorist
attacks we must punish terrorists for the damages they inflict. Therefore, we must respond
proportionately to terrorism.

Proportionality
A response to an attack must proportionally punish aggression. A nation must protect
its citizens from harm, but balance that protection by protecting the citizens of other nations.
The nature of the unjust act must determine the power of force one uses in response. Just
response to an unjust act requires just means. This means that one must not respond to
terrorism with more terrorism, even though it seems to be the most proportional; however, a
proportional alternative that is also a just response is destroying training camps or weapons
facilities of those responsible for terrorism. I contend that just response to aggression is
proportional when the response has three limitations. First, just response only harms people
responsible for the aggression. Not all members in a group are responsible for the group’s
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aggression. Second, just response is not an act of vengeance. Victims of aggression justly
defend themselves and the international community justly enforces law, but excessive harm is
not just punishment. Third, civilian causalities are proportionate to the military objective in a
just response. When responding to aggression, victims should balance achieving their
objective with minimizing civilian risk.
Kamm claims that it is permissible to harm people who are not responsible for
aggression. She asserts that an agent permissibly harms someone when that harm prevents
something that would harm him in the future; but she also argues that it is permissible for a
group to harm its own members to achieve a military objective. She explains that there are
special features of war that allows one to override Principle X (it is impermissible to act when
the foreseeable side effects cause more harm than the foreseeable benefits). One way Kamm
advocates overriding Principle X is that just states have the right to put its citizens in
intentional danger as a means to a goal. 97 Examples of this are drafting civilians to serve
during war and performing an act that is likely to kill some civilians when the cause is
important enough.
Although Kamm is correct that unjust acts deserve punishment, when one uses
military force to punish an unjust aggressor, one should never intend to put their
noncombatants or the enemy group’s noncombatants in danger. While punishment is
necessary to deter future unjust acts, a nation should either try to avoid or limit civilian risk.
In military action, there is always some civilian risk, but a just response tries to limit that risk
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by choosing a militarily suboptimal alternative. 98 The relevant objective in responding to
terrorism is preempting future attacks. Because civilian risk in war is high, one should
preempt terrorism by declaring war only when there is no time to try other alternatives.
Most cases of preventing future aggression do not require military force because
alternatives are available (e.g., financial obligations, trade sanctions, or international edicts).
Although these alternatives may affect people who are not responsible for the aggression, they
do not risk lives as much as war. Because war is hell, it is best not to continue it
unnecessarily. Short of war to overthrow a terrorist regime, a group should not respond to
terrorism by increasing civilian risk. Victims of terrorism should never respond with more
terrorism. They are to avoid war if other alternatives are available.
A proportional response is not one of revenge. Whereas justice is measured, revenge
has few if any limits. 99 Victims of terrorism must not decide the appropriate response to
terrorism quickly or consider the emotional states of the direct targets. Response to terrorism
must not be terrorism. Those who lead their nation into war must retain moral integrity
through the war so they can govern once the fighting ends. 100 A nation is capable of
governing its population in a just peace only when their response to aggression is just. Only
by evaluating the injustice committed and deliberating on a proportionate response within the
constraints of just war thinking can one develop a responsible response.
A just response is not proportional in the sense that it causes the same consequences as
the unjust act. When a nation kills civilians as a side effect to its just response, the deaths are
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necessary to achieve the objective. When an unjust act occurs, if the agent responsible did not
intend for the act to transpire, one must not intend to respond. Because terrorists intend the
consequences of their actions, one justly responds to terrorism with a measured response that
protects the lives of innocent people.

Discrimination
All acts of war must respect the immunity innocents. As argued in the section on just
conduct, in war agents must discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. This is
difficult when one is attempting to respond proportionately to a threat that does not
discriminate between combatants and noncombatants; however, a just actor must make this
discrimination. We must not take lightly the death of noncombatants, even as a side effect.
Determining a discriminate response to terrorism is challenging because terrorists are
generally not government actors. It is often difficult to distinguish terrorists from ordinary
civilians. Unless a specific terrorist publicly acknowledges his actions, one does not know
who is accountable for the unjust act. Although determining who is responsible may be
difficult, it is not acceptable to kill noncombatants intentionally in retribution for some
terrorist act. This would be tantamount to responding to terrorism with terrorism. Only by
finding who is responsible for “planning, aiding and abetting, and perpetuating” the unjust act
can a response to terrorism be just. 101
In part of Kamm’s argument that it is permissible to terror kill agents responsible for
unjust threats, she claims that one must determine who is responsible for unjust threats in
order to limit permissible terror killing. Kamm’s second special feature of war is that victims
may permissibly shift moral responsibility for the unjust action. This means that victims can
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attribute responsibility for terrorism to more agents than the terrorist actor. 102 If Kamm is
correct that we can shift responsibility, then we must discriminate between appropriate and
inappropriate shifts in a just response.
According to Kamm, victims of aggression have a “defensive screen” that allows them
to deflect the injustice of their actions to the groups responsible for the initial aggression. 103
Kamm identifies four appropriate shifts in responsibility for aggression. First, she explains
that victims can transfer responsibility for negative side effects of their act to the enemy when
the enemy puts people in harms way to deter their action. “A recognized example is when a
country itself puts bystanders in the way of what would otherwise by a just response to its
threat.” 104 In this shift, the enemy is responsible because if the enemy did not move
bystanders in the way of the response, the act is just. Second, the enemy is responsible for the
effects of victims redirecting a threat from the enemy back onto the enemy population. If one
nation is able to deflect a missile, but in doing so, the missile will harm the enemy population,
the enemy is responsible because they fired the missile. Third, if another country supports the
enemy’s unjust threat then victims can permissibly harm them because they are causally
responsible for the enemy threat. If the third party supplies weapons or harbors the aggressor,
then they are responsible for the aggressor succeeding in his unjust threat, so the third party is
responsible for the unjust threat. Fourth, if past acts of support for an enemy are the reason
why that enemy is an unjust threat now, then the past supporter is causally responsible for
victims’ acts toward them. Like the third shift, the past supporter has lowered inviolability
because it is responsible for why the act occurred. These four shifts mean that if an agent has
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just cause, any unjust act he commits is not his responsibility, but is the unjust aggressor’s
responsibility.
If an agent is able to shift the moral responsibility for his actions, then the injustice of
his unjust act is not his concern. Kamm does not examine the implications of shifting
responsibility; she claims only that whoever started the unjust war must take all responsibility
for what occurs in the war. This allows a nation to retaliate disproportionately to the unjust
action without any responsibility. Without checks on both sides, the war will become more
unjust because unjust acts, which neither side claims responsibility for, will continue. If an
agent has a responsibility to retaliate justly to an unjust threat, then the war will not escalate
inappropriately. Walzer remarks that “When we focus exclusively on the fact of aggression,
we are likely to lose sight of that responsibility and to talk as if there were only one morally
relevant decision to be made in the course of a war: to attack or not attack.” 105 But, we must
evaluate many decisions in war. Within a just and unjust war, we condemn specific acts by
their conduct. If an agent decides to use terrorism against a state, his act is unjust regardless
of whether or not the state is unjust.
Regardless if one’s cause is just or unjust, the means one uses to further his cause
contributes to the justice of one’s act. When we respond to terrorism, we have just cause
because terrorism is unjust, but we must also respond by using just means. This means that
we must respect the immunity of innocents. Just response to terrorism requires that our
actions intend to harm people guilty of terrorism and minimize risk to all others. Although
this makes responding to terrorism more difficult, we must not sacrifice justice for simplicity
or expediency. In cases where we do not know who is guilty, there may be no immediate
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response other than attempting to find the people at fault; however, we should not view the
occurrences of inaction negatively because the alternative is to punish innocent people out of
a desire for revenge, not justice.

The War on Terrorism
Because we must justly conduct a response to terrorism, we must limit our response to
actions intended to harm the people responsible for terrorism and to actions that do not result
in unnecessary civilian risk. The Bush administration declared a “war on terrorism,” which so
far includes two campaigns, one to respond to a terrorist attack (the war in Afghanistan) and
one to prevent more terrorism (the war in Iraq). In what follows, I evaluate the causes for the
two military campaigns using the resources of JWT. Although I do not address specific
conduct in these campaigns (e.g., torture, detention), the notions of discrimination and
proportionality are essential to evaluating the causes for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The United States’ causes for these wars were just if they knew who was responsible for a
legitimate threat and the war was necessary to stop that threat from acting. 106
Earlier I argued that the war on terrorism has just cause because terrorism is an unjust
threat that we should preempt; however, the administration did not have just cause for all
engagements in this war. President Bush’s strategy for the war on terrorism includes
preventative war:
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United
States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right
of self-defense. The United States will not resort to force in all cases to
preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary actions
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succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pretext for
aggression. 107
The Bush administration’s stated cause for future engagements in the war on terrorism is just.
Terrorism is an unjust threat, which one should prevent and one should use means short of
war if possible. Preventative war requires an additional constraint beyond the requirements of
responsive war. A preventative war attempts to prevent a perceived threat from acting and to
be just, it must be necessary to stop a legitimate threat in the immediate future. I argue that
the cause for war in Afghanistan was just because it was a responsive war for a past attack.
However, the war in Iraq was unjust because it was a preventative war the United States could
have avoided using means short of war. When a one aims to prevent future aggression, one is
just when one finds agents responsible for a legitimate threat and prevents them from
becoming aggressors using military intervention only when no alternatives are available.
Walzer’s first revision to the legalist paradigm allows for preventative strike against
an imminent unjust aggressor: “Both individuals and states can rightfully defend themselves
against violence that is imminent, but not actual; they can fire the first shots if they know
themselves about to be attacked.” 108 He explains that we can defend ourselves before attack
occurs and before the time that the effects of the act will necessarily harm us. JWT does not
require imminent victims to wait until aggressors harm them when they know that the harm
will occur. Imminent victims have just cause to prevent an imminent aggressor from acting
when the aggressor threatens them verbally and shows that he will attack.
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Just preventative wars knowingly stop an aggressor from attacking. When an agent
threatens and shows that he is capable of harming another agent, the victim has just cause for
response. Walzer explains that threats are different depending on circumstances, but a
legitimate threat is not “the boastful ranting to which political leaders are often prone, . . . the
kind of military preparation that is a feature of the classic arms race [unless it violates a
agreed-upon limit], . . . ‘hostile acts short of war,’ . . . [or] insults.” 109 All legitimate threats
include a verbal declaration of intent and some act that shows the aggressor’s intent (e.g.
troop mobilization). A just preventative attack requires legitimate threat of attack, but not
imminent attack because if the attack were imminent, striking first would not stop harm from
occurring. The aim of preemptive attack is to stop a threat from becoming actual; to stop
present threats, not possible future threats. This means that if there is time to try other
alternatives, even when faced with a legitimate threat, an attack is not just. If the war on
terrorism is just, it is a preventative war against a legitimate threat and nothing short of war is
available to stop that threat.
Wars to prevent terrorism are just if they intend to stop a legitimate threat of terrorism
from occurring, and without the war, terrorism will result. A legitimate terrorist threat
requires the terrorist to declare that he will harm the potential victim and show that he is
capable of harming the victim. Although this generally means that the terrorist acted
previously, prior terrorist acts are not necessary for a terrorist to be a legitimate threat. If an
agent states that he will harm innocents to coerce the group associated with the innocent and
reliable intelligence shows that war is the only way to stop the attack from occurring, the
potential victims have just cause to act preventatively. For one to prevent attack, one must
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know that an attack will occur. Because some group can attack does not mean it will attack;
therefore, if one uses war to prevent a weaker group from gaining capabilities but there is no
threat of attack, the war is not just. Likewise, if some group threatens to attack, but is not
capable of attack, attacking that group does not prevent anything. Even if the war is
“successful” (the attack does not occur), the war may have been unnecessary for success.
A preventative war on terrorism is unjust if an agent engages militarily with someone
or group who makes terrorist threats but is not capable of it or is capable of terrorism but does
not make terrorist threats. Military responses to terrorism are also unjust if they are against
someone or group who allegedly supports terrorists, but the possible attack is in the distant
future, or is capable of supporting terrorism but does not support terrorism. If one is able to
prevent the possible attack by using means other than war, but uses war, then the strike is
unjust.
Preventative wars are proportional and discriminatory when war is necessary to
achieve the military objective, when there is no time to use means other than war to stop the
attack. As explained earlier in the section on proportionality, victims must balance achieving
their objective with minimizing civilian risk. Because war increases civilian risk, and
combatant risk, one should use alternatives when possible. Although combatants should
minimize civilian risk by choosing militarily suboptimal means, when the war itself is
necessary to counter a legitimate threat, potential victims have just cause for war. 110 Just
preventative wars are discriminate because they target legitimate threats, not possible threats
in the distant future; they do not assume that a group is a threat simply because they are
capable of being a threat or is a threat when they are incapable of aggression. Just response to
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threat therefore requires the precondition the enemy declares its intention to harm and shows
that it is capable of harming. Instead of preventing a war that we do not know will occur by
using war, we should use available measures short of war. A first strike is just only when no
alternatives will stop a legitimate threat, so are wars in the war on terrorism just preventative
wars?
The Bush administration’s aim in the war on terrorism is to prevent terrorist attacks on
United States soil. Although the exact means to prevent all future terrorism is unclear,
President Bush has stated,
Ours [the war on terrorism] will be a broad campaign, fought on many
fronts. It's a campaign that will be waged by day and by night, in the light
and in the shadow, in battles you will see and battles you won't see. It's a
campaign waged by soldiers and sailors, Marines and airmen; and also by
FBI agents and law enforcement officials and diplomats and intelligence
officers. It's a campaign that is being waged in distant lands, and a
campaign being waged by our new Office of Homeland Security. 111
The war on terrorism uses all available means to prevent terrorism and many, especially those
that avoid military campaign, are just; however, because we must evaluate each engagement
in the war on terrorism separately for each has its own unique circumstances, I focus on the
two wars that has been fought in this “broad campaign.” I explain that the United States had
just cause for the war in Afghanistan because it was a responsive war to an actual threat. The
war in Iraq was not response to an actual threat; it was preventative response to a possible
threat. President Bush explained that war in Iraq was a just preventative war because
Hussein’s regime supported terrorism. 112 I disagree that the cause for war in Iraq was just
because alternative means were available that may have achieved the military objective. I
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argue that Hussein’s regime was a legitimate threat because he verbally threatened the United
States in the past and intelligence at that time concluded that it was likely he was developing
weapons of mass destruction, but war was not necessary for the United States to prevent
future aggression.
Intervention into Afghanistan by the United States was just because the United States
identified the Taliban as a regime that protected and provided resources to the terrorists who
attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. The United States had just cause to
respond to the unjust aggression. According to Walzer’s third revision, just punishment for
aggression is limited to deciding how to stop the aggressor from acting, how to restore the
negative effects of the aggression, and how to reasonably prevent the aggressor from acting
similarly again. To prevent al Qa’ida from attacking again, the United States had to destroy
the terrorist system embedded throughout Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan was had just
cause because the September 11th attacks made it clear that al Qa’ida would not compromise
with the United States or adhere to any restrictions placed on the group. The Taliban regime
refused to end their support of al Qa’ida and refused to exile al Qa’ida from Afghanistan;
therefore, the only alternative that would achieve the United States’ military objective of
preventing future al Qa’ida attacks, was intervention to overthrow the Taliban regime and
find and punish the members of al Qa’ida for their terrorist acts.
The war in Afghanistan was necessary to stop al Qa’ida from attacking again and the
decision to go to war was proportionate and discriminatory. Although civilians died because
of the war, the act that resulted in their deaths was just because the war was necessary. The
civilian deaths were proportionate to the just military objective because no alternative that
possessed less civilian risk would have achieved the objective. The war was discriminatory
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because the United States identified the group responsible for the September 11th attacks and
acted to prevent their future attacks. Therefore, the war in Afghanistan had just cause because
it identified a legitimate threat and responded with war because no alternative to war would
stop al Qa’ida from attacking.
On 19 March 2003, President Bush informed the nation that the United States invaded
Iraq. The causes for war were to “undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war” and
“remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.” 113 President Bush
explained that Hussein’s regime was developing weapons of mass destruction and if he
continued, the United States would be a target. Although at this time, President Bush did not
state that Hussein would support terrorism if allowed to continue developing weapons, in a
later statement he included the objective of ending Hussein’s support of terrorism to the war
effort. 114
The administration correctly identified Hussein’s regime as willing to support of
future terrorism. 115 Hussein used chemical and biological weapons on the Kurds in the war
with Iran and there was no reason to think that he was averse to using them in the future.
Given the increased hostilities between the United States and Hussein’s regime, if Hussein
acquired new weapons of mass destruction, it was possible that he would target them or give
them to terrorists who would target the United States. If there was evidence that Hussein had
weapons of mass destruction, then the United States had just cause to seize the weapons;
however, military intervention was not necessary to seize weapons. All that the United States
needed to do in order to confiscate the weapons was to enforce of pre-established inspections.
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Following the first Gulf War, the United Nations imposed restrictions on Hussein’s
development of weapons of mass destruction. The restrictions included mandatory
inspections of Iraqi facilities and destruction of such weapons if found, but starting in the
mid-90s, Hussein delayed inspections and refused access to inspectors. Because no country
or agency used military force to compel the inspections, Hussein continued to refuse access to
the facilities and eventually the United Nations stopped attempting to inspect the facilities. If
the United Nations, or even the United States, had used military force at this time, the act
would have been just because the inspections were mandatory. Nonetheless, no one enforced
the inspections.
In the months preceding the Iraq war, President Bush worried the United States’
renewed interest in the inspections would fail to convince Hussein to permit access to
weapons facilities. Because no country desired to enforce the inspections by military
personnel accompanying the inspectors, President Bush feared that renewing the inspections
would further delay the international community from knowing if Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction. This delay would increase our risk of attack, so the United States invaded Iraq to
overthrow the Hussein regime so that he could not support terrorists in the future.
The administration’s cause for war in Iraq was problematic because the United States
did not know if Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.116 The United States did not know if
within a few days or weeks Hussein would use, or give to terrorists to use, weapons of mass
destruction. If the United States knew or even thought that Hussein was an immediate
legitimate threat, they would not have spent months attempting to gain international support.
The war’s aim was to prevent possible terrorist attacks in a distant future.
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In Iraq, the preventative war was disproportionate because an alternative with less
civilian risk was available that would still achieve the military objective. Because the
restrictions were still in place, all needed to renew mandatory inspections of Iraqi facilities
was some nation(s) to enforce the inspections. Although international enforcement would be
best, the United States could have sent American soldiers to enforce the inspections. This
alternative would impose less civilian risk than intervention because it would not overthrow
Hussein’s regime or increase civilian risk throughout all of Iraq. The conflicts, if any, would
occur if the inspectors met military resistance. If Hussein continued to refuse inspections,
only then would the United States have a just cause for war because he refused to comply
with mandatory restrictions.
Mandatory restrictions would not remove Hussein from power, so would not meet all
of the military objectives for going to war. In its stated reasons for the war in Iraq, the Bush
administration included the humanitarian objective of saving the Iraqi people from a brutal
dictator. 117 In the second revision to the legalist paradigm, Walzer explains that a nation can
violate the principle of non-intervention when the citizens of another nation suffer enough
harm to warrant humanitarian intervention. For the harm suffered to be egregious enough for
intervention, it must make self-determination impossible. In Iraq, the suffering was not
enough to warrant humanitarian intervention because other methods were in place that
successfully prevented acts by Hussein that would warrant intervention. 118 For example,
before the war occurred, the United States already enforced no-fly zones in the north to
protect attack against the Kurds and in the south to protect attack against the Shi’ites. In these
zones, the United States targeted and hit radar and anti-aircraft facilities with few civilian
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deaths. These zones prevented Hussein from reigning freely over Iraq and exterminating the
Kurds and Shi’ites. If Hussein did commit genocide then the United States would be just in
implementing a humanitarian intervention; however, he did not, so overthrowing his regime
to alleviate any suffering was not just.
The United States could have achieved the objective of preventing Hussein from
supporting terrorism without intervention by using an alternative that possessed less civilian
risk; therefore, the war in Iraq is unjust. Unlike the threat of the Taliban supporting al Qa’ida
in Afghanistan, the threat of Hussein supporting terrorists was not imminent. Although the
United States correctly pointed out that the international community should do something to
prevent Hussein from supporting terrorism, war was not the correct choice of action. Instead,
the United Nations should have renewed inspections with military force from any country
willing to provide enforcement. If Hussein rebuffed this enforcement, only then would the
United States have just cause for war.
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CONCLUSION
When one uses the term “terrorism” to refer to any bad activity, one confuses a
terrorist’s cause with his means to advance that cause. Terrorism is distinct from other forms
of political violence by the means terrorists use, not because of their causes. A terrorist is an
agent who uses, or threatens to use, premeditated violence against noncombatants in order to
coerce a group into some course of action. Contrary to what an intuitive definition of
terrorism entails, some unjust actions are not terrorism.
Walzer’s theory of aggression provides us with the necessary resources to evaluate the
war on terrorism. According to Walzer, a just war responds to aggression and uses just
means. The war on terrorism is just if it is a response to unjust aggression and uses just
means to punish the aggression; therefore, for victims of terrorism to have just cause for
response, terrorism must be unjust.
Terrorism is unjust because it is a strategy that violates the rules of conduct in war.
All terrorism intends to harm people not responsible for alleged injustice, so all terrorism
violates the immunity of noncombatants. Unlike just collateral damage in conventional war,
terrorists do not try to minimize civilian risk. Terrorists maximize civilian risk to further their
cause. Therefore, nations have just cause to respond to terrorism.
Responses to terrorism must be constrained by the principles of discrimination and
proportionality. In order for a response to be just, it must balance the immunity of
noncombatants with the objective of preventing future attacks. Although there is civilian risk
in most military alternatives, the responding nation must try to avoid or reduce it by choosing
an alternative that achieves the objective with the least civilian risk. Moreover, a just
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response discriminates between people responsible and people not responsible for terrorism.
We should not blame a group who is not responsible for terrorism simply because we want
revenge for our suffering.
The Bush administration claims that future preventative wars in the war on terrorism
will be just because the United States will use war only when other means fail. However, if
the past is an indicator of the future, the United States will continue to use preventative war
when means short of war are available. The United States had just cause for the war in
Afghanistan because the Taliban refused to end their support of al Qa’ida, who verbally
threatened and showed they were capable of attacking the United States. War was the only
option because the Taliban refused to cooperate with the United States and continued to
harbor and protect unjust aggressors. The war in Iraq was not a just preventative war because
the United States could have chosen an alternative to war that possessed less civilian risk.
Renewing and enforcing the United Nations inspections of Iraqi facilities was an available
alternative that may have prevented or stopped Hussein from developing weapons of mass
destruction, and thereby prevented his support of terrorism. By defining terrorism as a
specific strategy and using the resources of JWT, we will be able to evaluate future potential
terrorism in a manner that will provide legitimate grounds for dissent and approval of future
military engagements in the war on terrorism.
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